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Abstract
Unimodal maps have been broadly used as a base of new encryption strategies. Recently, a stream cipher
has been proposed in the literature, whose keystream is basically a symbolic sequence of the (one-parameter)
logistic map or of the tent map. In the present work a thorough analysis of the keystream is made which
reveals the existence of some serious security problems.
Key words: Unimodal maps, symbolic dynamics, stream cipher, known-plaintext attack, control
parameter estimation, initial condition estimation.
1. Introduction
The partition of the state space transforms a measure-preserving dynamical system into a stationary
stochastic process called a symbolic dynamics. In the case of chaotic systems (i.e., governed by chaotic
maps), the resulting symbolic dynamics has some specific properties, like sensitivity to initial conditions and
strong mixing, which are very attractive for cryptographic purposes. For instance, the symbolic dynamics
of a chaotic map can be used as a Random Number Generator (RNG) [1] and, more generally, as a source
of entropy. Unimodal maps are particularly useful in this regard, since their generating partitions comprise
two intervals, thus leading to a natural source of Random Bit Generators (RBGs). Among all possible
applications of RNGs and RBGs in cryptography, their role as keystream generators in stream ciphers is
especially important.
Recently a stream cipher based on the symbolic dynamics of the (one-parameter) logistic map and tent
map, was proposed in [2]. If the parameter of either map is selected conveniently, then its symbolic sequences
pass all the statistical tests necessary for their consideration as keystreams. However, we show that this
requirement is not enough to guarantee the security of this stream cipher and point out some cryptographic
weaknesses.
The work described in this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 the encryption scheme of [2] is
explained. After that, some issues relevant to the security of the cryptosystem are highlighted (Sec. 3). In
Sec. 4 the cryptosystem is analyzed taking into account the dynamics of the underlying chaotic system. The
problems derived from the selection of the logistic and tent maps are also discussed there. Finally, the main
results and conclusions of the work are summarized in Sec. 5.
2. Description of the encryption scheme
In the cryptosystem described in [2] the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is done bitwise
and driven by symbolic sequences generated either by the logistic map or by the tent map. Recall that the
logistic map is defined as
fλ(x) = λx(1 − x), (1)
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for x ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ [0, 4], and the tent map is given by the following equation:
fλ(x) =
{
x/λ, if 0 ≤ x < λ,
(1− x)/(1− λ), if λ ≤ x ≤ 1,
(2)
where x ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ (0, 1). Henceforth we will refer to λ as the control parameter.
Given a closed interval I ⊂ R and a map f : I → I , the orbit of (the initial condition) x ∈ I is defined
as the set Of (x) = {f
n(x) : n ∈ N0}, where N0 = {0} ∪ N = {0, 1, ...}, f
0(x) = x and fn(x) = f
(
fn−1(x)
)
.
A continuous map defined on an interval of R that is increasing (decreasing) to the left of an interior point
and decreasing (increasing) thereafter is said to be unimodal. Examples of unimodal maps are provided by
the logistic and tent maps. A unimodal map attains its maximum (minimum) at a single point xc (xc = 1/2
for the logistic map, and xc = λ for the tent map), called the critical point. If f : I → I is unimodal, then
any orbit can be encoded into a binary sequence,
B∞(f, x) = {Bi(f, x)}
∞
i=0 = θ(f
0(x))θ(f1(x)) . . . θ(fN−1(x))..., (3)
where θ(·) is the step function
θ(y) =
{
0, if y < xc,
1, if y ≥ xc.
(4)
In [2] the plaintext is encrypted through the symbolic dynamics of either the logistic map or the tent
map, with fixed control parameter λ and initial condition x0. If the plaintext is N bit long, then the first
m+N points of Ofλ(x0) are computed with the selected map, and the corresponding symbolic sequence is
produced. The firstm bits of this symbolic sequence are used to bear the initial condition. Indeed, according
to the theory of symbolic dynamics, given ε > 0 and a generating partition α of I with respect to f (like
the partition α = {[0, xc), [xc, 1]} in the case of unimodal maps of the unit interval), any real number x ∈ I
can be represented with precision ε as a symbolic sequence of f with respect to α, with initial condition x
and length above a certain threshold [3]. Therefore, once the precision ε has been set, m is chosen to be
larger than the corresponding threshold. The scheme proposed in [2] divides the finite binary sequence
Bm+N(fλ, x0) = {Bi(fλ, x0)}
m+N−1
k=0 = θ(f
0(x))θ(f1(x)) . . . θ(fm+N−1(x))
into two segments: Binit = {Biniti }
m−1
i=0 with B
init
i = Bi(fλ, x0), and B
ks = {Bksi }
N−1
i=0 with B
ks
i =
Bm+i(fλ, x0). The initial segment B
init contains the information on x0 up to the precision wished. The
final segment Bks is the keystream of the cipher, i.e., the plaintext P = {Pi}
N−1
i=0 is transformed into the
pre-ciphertext C = {Ci}
N−1
i=0 according to
Ci = Pi ⊕B
ks
i = Pi ⊕Bm+i(fλ, x0), (5)
where i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, and 0 ⊕ 0 = 1 ⊕ 1 = 0, 0 ⊕ 1 = 1 ⊕ 0 = 1. Finally, the pre-ciphertext C and
Binit are combined into the ciphertext or encrypted message M = {Mi}
m+N−1
i=0 which is sent to the receiver
through an insecure channel. The generation of M is driven by a shuffler block, implementing an injective
map pi : {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1} 7→ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1, N}, which inserts the m bits of Binit into the pre-ciphertext C
according to the following rule. (a) If 0 ≤ pi(i) ≤ N − 1, then Biniti is inserted before Cpi(i); (b) if pi(i) = N ,
then Biniti is inserted after CN−1, i.e., Mm+N−1 = B
init
i . Thus, a ciphertext with, say, pi(i) < N for all i,
looks as follows:
M = C0C1 · · ·Ci0−1B
init
j0 Ci0 · · ·Cim−1−1B
init
jm−1Cim−1 · · ·CN−1, (6)
where pi(jk) = ik, k ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m − 1}, and i0 < ... < im−1. The shuffler block, i.e., the map pi, is also
known at the receiver, thus making the recovery of x0 feasible.
In sum, the encryption is done in three steps:
(1) Symbolic sequence: Bm+N (fλ, x0) = B
init
∥∥Bks (‖ stands for “juxtaposition”).
(2) Pre-ciphertext : C = P⊕Bks (the ⊕ operation is bitwise)
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(3) Ciphertext : M = pi
(
Binit
∥∥C) (abusing notation, pi(S1‖S2) stands here and henceforth for the action
of the shuffling map pi on the binary sequence S1‖S2 of length m+N , as exemplified in Eq. (6)).
In order to decrypt M, the receiver extracts Binit from M to determine x0; the remaining bits form C.
This allows the receiver to replicate Bks by computing the orbit of x0 under the selected chaotic map, using
the right value of the control parameter. Lastly, the plaintext is recovered as
Pi = Ci ⊕B
ks
i = Ci ⊕Bm+i(fλ, x0), (7)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
An explicit definition of the key of the cryptosystem is not given in [2]. Nevertheless, in [2, Sec. 3] it is
pointed out that the map selected (either the logistic map or the tent map), its control parameter, and the
position of the bits of Binit in M are necessary to recover the plaintext. Henceforth, it is assumed that the
key consists of these three elements or “subkeys”. The map pi used in the shuffler block might be given by
an m-dimensional vector pi = [pi(0), · · · , pi(m − 1)], where pi(i) is a ⌈log2(N + 1)⌉-bit integer. In practice,
a secret seed s could be used to generate the map pi in a pseudo-random manner; in this case, the subkey
corresponding to the shuffler reduces to the seed s.
3. Design problems
3.1. Key space
The complete definition of a cryptosystem demands the precise and thorough specification of the set of
values of the secret key [4, Rule 5]. As mentioned above, the control parameter and the initial condition of
the chaotic map (necessary to build the pre-cipher text C) are certainly part of the key. In relation with the
control parameter, the considered maps must be evaluated to guarantee that they evolve chaotically during
the encryption stage. In the case of the logistic map, the selection of adequate values for λ is quite complex
since the bifurcation diagram of this map possesses a dense set of periodic windows [5]. Therefore, if the
keystream has to be generated with the logistic map, one must assure that the Lyapunov exponent of fλ is
positive.
On the other hand, the tent map is not a good source for generating pseudo-random bits from its
symbolic dynamics. Since the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] is an ergodic invariant measure of the tent map for
all λ ∈ (0, 1) [6], it follows that the ratio between the number of 1-bits and 0-bits in a typical orbit coincides
with the ratio between the lengths of the intervals [λ, 1] and [0, λ), namely, 1−λλ . Therefore, in order to have
an approximately balanced bit sequence Bks, λ should be close to 1/2.
3.2. Considerations about the synchronization procedure
In chaos-based cryptosystems, decryption of the ciphertext requires perfect regeneration of the orbit(s)
involved in the encryption stage. This being the case, the receiver must know the control parameter(s) and
the initial condition(s) used by the transmitter. Those values can be obtained by the receiver from either
the secret key or the design specifications. However, the agreement on the initial condition can be settled
indirectly using synchronization techniques. Indeed, if the chaotic systems at the transmitter and receiver
are suitably coupled, their orbits converge to each other although they have been derived from different
initial conditions. Synchronization implies that, after a transient time, the chaotic system(s) at the receiver
reproduces the dynamics of the chaotic systems(s) at the transmitter, which further allows the recovering
of the plaintext without knowledge of x0. This is certainly not the case of the cryptosystem proposed in [2],
since the initial condition have to be known in order to reproduce the keystream Bks. As a consequence,
the whole ciphertext must be received before decryption can start while, in conventional synchronization
schemes, decryption is progressively achieved during the reception of the ciphertext. We conclude that,
what is called synchronization in [2] is rather a method to codify and send the initial condition, than a usual
synchronization technique.
Furthermore, nothing is mentioned in [2] about how x0 is obtained from B
init. We briefly address this
issue here. According to the theory of symbolic dynamics, a symbolic sequence of length L partitions the
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state interval I into 2L subintervals I
(L)
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2
L, that is, I = I
(L)
1 ∪ I
(L)
2 · · · ∪ I
(L)
2L , with I
(L)
j ∩ I
(L)
k = ∅
for j 6= k. The binary sequences of length L obtained for each x ∈ I
(L)
j are the same. Therefore, a given
symbolic sequence of length L singles out the subinterval I
(L)
j its initial condition x0 belongs to, what
provides an estimation of x0. The estimation error depends on the width of I
(L)
j , which in turn depends
on the map considered. In the case of the symmetric tent map (i.e., the tent map with λ = 1/2), all the
subintervals I
(L)
j have width equal to 1/(2
L) (see Fig. 1). Hence if the first n bits of BL(f1/2, x0) locate
x0 in the subinterval [k/2
n, (k + 1)/2n], then the bit Bn determines whether x0 belongs to either the left
(Bn = 0) or the right (Bn = 1) half of that subinterval. Nevertheless, this dichotomic search cannot be
done in a general case. Indeed, the subintervals I
(L)
j associated to the logistic map and the tent map with
λ 6= 1/2 are not equal-width. However, in [7] it is shown that the symbolic sequences of unimodal maps can
be assigned a linear order. This linear order preserves the order of the corresponding initial conditions in R
and can be used to estimate x0 through a binary search procedure [8].
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Figure 1: Symbolic intervals for different iterations of the symmetric tent map.
4. Problems derived from the dynamics of the underlying chaotic systems
A crucial step in the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem is the selection of the underlying chaotic
map(s). In this section it is shown that the choice of the logistic map and the tent map for the scheme
proposed in [2] implies serious security problems.
First of all, due to lack of details in [2], it is assumed that the interleaving of the symbolic block Binit
in the pre-ciphertext C to build the ciphertext M, is performed in a random way. In a chosen-plaintext
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attack, a cryptanalyst has access to the encryption device and thus can obtain the output corresponding
to any input. If Pi = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, i.e., all the bits of the plaintext P are chosen to be zero, then
C = 0 ⊕ Bks = Bks, and the corresponding ciphertext is pi
(
Binit
∥∥Bks). Call this particular ciphertext
Bshuffled. According to [9], given a symbolic sequence BL(fλ, x0) of a unimodal map fλ (see Eq.(3)), both
the control parameter λ and the initial condition x0 can be estimated in a straightforward way. Actually,
the problem we are dealing with is not quite the same, since the available symbolic sequences are distorted
through the permutation procedure. Nevertheless, we will presently show that the estimation of the control
parameter is still possible using Bshuffled = pi
(
Binit
∥∥Bks) instead of Bm+N(fλ, x0) = Binit∥∥Bks, where fλ
is the logistic map or the tent map, and the estimation method depends on fλ. Consequently the first step
in the cryptanalysis of this cipher calls for discerning the chaotic map used in the generation of Bshuffled, the
encryption of P = 0. Once this step has been completed, the next step is to estimate the control parameter.
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Figure 2: Wootters’ distance of the logistic map with respect to the logistic map. The length of the symbolic sequences is
N = 104, whereas the words are of width w = 10.
4.1. Identification of the chaotic map from symbolic sequences
The dynamics of every chaotic system has some particular characteristics that make it distinct. These
“fingerprints” are also present in their symbolic dynamics and can be brought to light via statistical compar-
ison of the corresponding symbolic sequences. A method along these lines exploits the “statistical distance”
between symbolic sequences to discriminate one chaotic map from another. In this paper we consider the
statistical distance defined by Wootters [10]. Let Pi =
{
p
(i)
j
}N
j=1
(i = 1, 2) be two probability distributions.
Wootters’ statistical distance between P1 and P2 is given by
DW (P1, P2) = cos
−1

 N∑
j=1
√
p
(1)
j · p
(2)
j

 . (8)
Since DW is calculated from two probability distributions, it is necessary to establish a method to derive a
probability distribution from the dynamics of a unimodal map. Let BL(fλ, x0) be a symbolic sequence of
a unimodal map fλ. A probability distribution can be obtained from BL(fλ, x0) just by grouping all bits
in a sliding window of length w. As a result, a binary sequence of length L is transformed into a sequence
of L− w + 1 w-bit integers (or words), taking some of the 2w possible values. The probability distribution
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Figure 3: Wootters’ distance of the skew tent map with respect to the logistic map for N = 104 and w = 10.
associated to BL(fλ, x0) is determined by counting the number of occurrences of each word and dividing
the result by L− w + 1.
In the case under consideration, the sequence Bm+N (fλ, x0) = B
init
∥∥Bks generated at the transmitter,
is not accessible to the cryptanalyst. Indeed, as explained in Sec. 3, a chosen-plaintext attack with P = 0
returns Bshuffled = pi(Bm+N (fλ, x0)) rather than Bm+N (fλ, x0), which amounts to the presence of noise in
the calculated probability distribution. Therefore, the parameters N and w must be selected to guarantee
a small value of Wootters’ distance between the probability distributions obtained from Bm+N (fλ, x0) and
the one derived from Bshuffled. From this point of view, it is convenient to have a large value of N and a
small value of w. On the other hand, the value of w should not be very small, since the entropy of the
probability distribution must be as close as possible to the entropy of the underlying chaotic system to
achieve an accurate reconstruction of the dynamics involved. Our experience shows that the choice w & 10
and N ≥ 104 implies a drastic reduction of the noise induced by the shuffling process.
Wootters’ distance can be used, for example, to estimate the control parameter of the logistic map.
This task is carried out by computing Wootters’ distance from the symbolic sequence Bshuffled (generated
with an unknown value λˆ of the control parameter) to the symbolic sequences generated with λ ranging
in an interval. These distances are computed in Fig. 2 for two values of λˆ with N = 104 and w = 10;
the corresponding symbolic sequences were generated with different initial conditions. Figure 2 shows that
around the right value of λ there exists a basin of attraction, which leads immediately to an estimation of
λˆ. Furthermore, the basin of attraction is always easily observed independently of the shuffling procedure,
as it has been verified through different simulations and random interleaving of Binit and Bks.
If we consider now a symbolic sequence of the tent map with control parameter λˆ, then Wootters’ distance
to the logistic map produces a picture with no basin of attraction (see Fig. 3(a), where the Wootters’ distance
is always upper 0.9) or with a basin of attraction around λ = 4 (see Fig. 3(b)). In this case, we conclude
that the chosen map is the logistic map with λˆ = 4, or the tent map with an unknown value for the control
parameter. A further analysis of Wootters’ distance to the tent map makes possible to discard the logistic
map in this situation. Figure 4 depicts Wootters’ distance to the tent map when Bshuffled is generated using
the tent map with two different values for λˆ. Again, it is possible to discern a basin of attraction around λˆ,
which has been verified for different random configurations of the interleaving of Binit and Bks. Nevertheless,
there is an especial situation where it is impossible to distinguish the logistic map from the tent map. It
occurs for the logistic map with λ = 4 and the skew tent map with λ = 0.5. In this situation, both maps
are topological conjugate [11, p. 68] and the Wootters’ distance of the logistic map with respect to the tent
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Figure 4: Wootters’ distance of the skew tent map with respect to the skew tent map for N = 104 and w = 10.
map shows a basin of attraction around λ = 0.5. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view it is possible
to discern between both maps even when there exists topological conjugacy, since when working with finite
precision arithmetics the symmetric tent map possesses a “digitally stable” 1 fixed point at x = 0. The effects
of digital degradation for the symmetric tent map can be observed in Fig. 4. Indeed, digital degradation is
the reason why Wootters’ distance with respect to the tent map always shows peaks at λ = 0.5. However, if
the Wootters’ distance of the logistic map with λ = 4 to the skew tent map is calculated, we can observed
that it appears a peak instead of a basin of attraction (see Fig. 5(a)), which can be used to distinguish the
logistic map from the skew tent map when the theoretical condition of topological conjugacy is satisfied. As
a matter of fact, digital degradation causes a dependency of the shape of Wootters’ distance with respect to
the initial condition of the given symbolic sequence, and also with respect to the quantization steps used in
its computation. Future work will be focused on the further and thoroughly examination of that dependence.
We conclude that Wootters’ distance between a given symbolic sequence and a large set of symbolic
sequences of the logistic map, can discriminate which chaotic map has been used in the encryption procedure.
Furthermore, Wootters’ distance leads to an estimation of the control parameter of both the logistic map
and tent map, which can be further improved as it is shown next.
4.2. Estimation of the control parameter from symbolic sequences
As mentioned above, the method to estimate the control parameter from symbolic sequences depends on
the underlying chaotic map. In the case of the logistic map, the critical point does not depend on the control
parameter, whereas the control parameter determines the critical point for the tent map. This explains the
need for different estimation methods.
4.2.1. Control parameter estimation for the logistic map
A method to estimate the control parameter of unimodal maps with a fixed critical point using symbolic
sequences, can be easily derived from the results of [7], as shown in [9], and applied to cryptanalysis in
[13, 14, 15]. As it was mentioned above, in [7] it is proved that for a certain family of unimodal maps
F which includes both the logistic map and the tent map, it is possible to assign a linear order to their
1The term “digitally stable” means that the fixed point is stable under finite computing precision. That is, any chaotic
orbit will finally lead to x = 0 after a limited number of iterations. The number of iterations has an upper bound determined
by the finite precision. Some discussions on this phenomenon with floating-point arithmetic can be found in [12].
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Figure 5: Wootters’ distance of the (a) logistic map for λˆ = 4 and x0 = 0.593563; and (b) the skew tent map for λˆ = 0.5 and
x0 = 0.213988 respect to the skew tent map for N = 104 and w = 10. The quantization steps of x- and y-axis are 2−6 and 2−4
respectively.
symbolic sequences, denoted by ≤, that preserves the order of the corresponding initial conditions in R. To
be specific, if I ⊂ R is a closed interval and f : I → I belongs to F , then (i) BL(f, x1) < BL(f, x2) implies
x1 < x2, and (ii) x1 < x2 implies BL(f, x1) ≤ BL(f, x2), where x1, x2 ∈ I. In particular, for the logistic
and tent maps it follows:
(A) BL(fλ, x) ≤ BL(fλ, fλ(xc)), ∀x ∈ [0, 1], eventually after a transient orbit in the case of the logistic
map.
(B) If λ1 < λ2, then BL(fλ1 , fλ1(xc)) ≤ BL(fλ2 , fλ2(xc)), since the critical value fλ(xc) is a non-decreasing,
monotone function of λ.
The estimation of the control parameter of the logistic map fλ is based on (A) and (B), and it proceeds
in two stages.
1. Search for the maximum binary sequence of length l ≤ L contained in BL(fλ, x0).
2. Use the maximum binary sequence and the monotonic relation between Bl(fλ, fλ(xc)) and λ, to get
an estimation of λ through a binary search procedure [9].
In the scheme defined in [2], L = m+N and, as mentioned before, a chosen-plaintext attack with P = 0
returns Bshuffled = pi(Bm+N (fλ, x0)) instead of Bm+N (fλ, x0) = B
init
∥∥Bks. This problem can be overcome
by considering not only the maximum binary sequence of length l ≤ m + N in Bm+N (fλ, x0), but the
set of the, say, Q greatest sequences of length l. If the interleaving of Binit in Bks is done randomly, it
was verified experimentally that for Q large enough, the set of the Q greatest sequences of length l always
includes Bmaxl (fλ, x0) or a good estimation of it, B
max
l (fλ, x0) being the maximum sequence obtained from
Bm+N(fλ, x0). In [15] it is pointed out that a good estimation of λ requires values of Q over 10
6 ≈ 220 (a
typical number in actual chosen-plaintext attacks); the estimation error lies then below 10−8 (see Fig.1 in
[15]). In our case, this estimation is also degraded by the fact that the method is applied on approximated
values of Bmaxl (fλ, x0). Needless to say, an estimation of λ amounts to reducing the key space, and this
compromises the security of the cipher. All in all this analysis underlines the critical role of the shuffler in
the encryption scheme of [2].
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Figure 6: Error in the estimation of the control parameter of the tent map from the ratio between 1-bits and 0-bits in Bshuffled.
4.2.2. Control parameter estimation for the tent map
The method described in the previous section does not apply to the tent map because its critical point
depends on the control parameter: xc = λ. In this case, we can resort to the analysis of the ratio between
1-bits and 0-bits in symbolic sequences of the tent map. As it was emphasized in Sec. 3.1, this ratio is
equal to R = 1−λλ , hence it can be used to estimate of the control parameter. Moreover, the number of
1-bits and 0-bits is not modified by the shuffling procedure, so the estimation of the control parameter can
be performed on Bshuffled instead. Fig. 6 shows the error in the recovery of the control parameter from
the ratio R obtained with different Bshuffled and λ ranging in (0, 1). The estimation error decreases as the
length of the plaintext N increases, but a perfect recovery of λ requires not only large values of N but also
extended-precision arithmetic libraries. Indeed, when implementing the cryptosystem, the shortcomings of
finite precision arithmetic and finite statistical sampling causes a deviation of the computed value of R from
its theoretical value, which further entails a residual error in the estimation of λ. It was experimentally
verified that this residual error is around 10−4, the numerical simulations being carried out with double-
precision floating-point arithmetic. In any case, the estimation of the control parameter of both the logistic
map and tent map, implies a severe reduction of the key space that must be taken into account when
designing the cipher.
4.3. Digital degradation
A main characteristic of stream ciphers is that the keystreams must have a very long period. In the
context under examination, the period of the keystreams depends on the periodic behavior of the symbolic
sequences of the logistic map and the tent map. It is well known that any finite-precision orbit, hence
any symbolic sequence of chaotic map, is periodic. This problem is especially important in the case of the
symmetric tent map. In particular, for λ = 0.5 the origin is an attractive fix point for all orbits, and this
represents a complete degradation of the random properties of the corresponding keystreams. Therefore,
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the recommendations given in [6] must be taken into account in order to avoid the consequences of the
dynamical degradation.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a recent stream cipher that is built on the symbolic sequences of the
(parametric) logistic and tent maps. We conclude that this cipher is insecure since a chosen-plaintext attack
makes possible to estimate the control parameter of the underlying chaotic map, based on a “noisy” version
of the keystream. This estimation can be done with an approximate error that goes from 10−4 (tent map)
to 10−8 (logistic map), what amounts to a strong reduction of the key space. More generally, the results of
this paper and of [16] hint to the fact that symbolic sequences of unimodal maps are insecure when used as
keystreams.
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